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I. INTRODUCTION 
‘International law is a legal system.’ Thus begins the first of 42 conclusions formulated 
by the ILC Study Group on the fragmentation of international law.1 The sentence is more 
a postulate than an actual conclusion, and a disputed one at that. After all, much of the 
current discussion on the fragmentation of international law is motivated precisely by the 
suspicion that international law might actually not be a system, at least not an internally 
coherent one the way we think of domestic legal systems. The Study Group thus 
postulates an answer to an ontological question – whether international law actually is a 
system – in order to answer the technical question of how to deal with conflicts and 
interrelation between its rules. 
This is difficult enough for the kind of conflicts that the report identifies as the 
most relevant ones: conflicts between ‘principles that may often point in different 
directions … new types of treaty clauses or practices that may not be compatible with old 
general law or the law of some other specialized branch’.2 The discovery of Multisource 
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Equivalent Norms (MSEN)3 suggests that the challenge is even more fundamental: even 
where rules in different regimes do not point in different directions, the question which of 
them is applicable remains. This suggests that the fragmentation of international law does 
not only imply a plurality of values; it also implies a plurality of techniques. 
The assumption for many participants in the debate, what we call here the 
ontological question – whether international law is a coherent system – has not only 
technical but predominantly normative implications, or is even itself, really, a normative 
question. There exists a widespread normative preference for coherence over 
fragmentation, order over disorder, system over plurality. We do not go so far as to claim 
that the question of whether international law is a coherent system or not is normatively 
irrelevant. However, we do think that its normative implications are overrated, and that 
the main problems with fragmentation are technical, not normative, in nature. If the 
resolution of conflicts were only possible within a coherent system, then the question of 
whether international law is such a system would have direct normative implications. If, 
by contrast, it could be shown that conflicts can be resolved also in the absence of one 
coherent system, then what looked like a normative question would become a technical 
one: the prime question is then which of different types of technical rules we have to 
apply to deal with the conflict. 
The ILC report rightly points out that, in order to deal with fragmentation, ‘it is 
useful to have regard to the wealth of techniques in the traditional law’.4 The rules it 
refers to, and limits its inquiry to, are rules concerning conflicts within a legal system. We 
refer to this approach as ‘conflict of norms’, with reference to the title and type of 
analysis conducted by one of us in an earlier book.5 These rules are rules on hierarchical 
relations, presumptions of statutory interpretation, and principles of balancing (eg on how 
different rules within Belgian law interrelate). Use of these rules appears to presuppose 
that international law is a system comparable to a domestic legal system.  Indeed, it 
appears scholars often want to see international law as a system (rather than a pluralist or 
fragmented agglomeration) in part because this makes it possible to apply traditional 
                                                 
3 Tomer Broude and Yuval Shany, 'Introduction: The International Law and Policy Governing Multi-
Sourced Equivalent Norms,' in this volume.## (will be added) 
4 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 1) at para 250 (p 406). 
5 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflicts of Norms in Public International Law  (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). Note that ‘norms’ is here not opposed to law. 
conflict-of-norms rules (such as the principles of lex posterior or lex specialis).  When the 
report of the ILC Study Group discusses ideas of legal pluralism, for example, it does so 
with the concern that such pluralism will be incompatible with the systematic approach 
and the rules on conflict of norms it encompasses.6 Its main author, Martti Koskenniemi, 
has elsewhere expressed his normative concerns over such pluralism.7 
As a matter of fact, rules to deal with pluralism exist, and conflict-of-norms rules 
are not the only set of rules for conflicts. Another set of rules in ‘traditional law’ concerns 
conflicts between legal systems (which we will refer to as ‘conflict of laws’ or ‘private 
international law solutions’). These rules are typically rules of domestic law that 
determine which of several domestic substantive laws should apply (eg whether Belgian 
or German law applies to a fact pattern), according to certain factors, for example, the 
location of the object in question or the nationality of the parties. 
Both sets of rules – ‘conflict-of-norms’ rules and ‘conflict-of-laws’ rules – were 
traditionally developed with regard not to international law but to domestic legal systems. 
Rules on hierarchical relations between rules and on systematic statutory interpretation 
were created within the context of domestic legal systems. Rules on conflict of laws are 
also mostly rules of domestic law (though they have at least in part been derived from 
principles of international law,8) but they have been applied to conflicts between the laws 
of different states, not to conflicts between different treaties. Such conflict-of-laws rules 
have occasionally been considered for public international law, too. In 1953, Wilfred 
Jenks argued that ‘some of the problems which [conflicts of law-making treaties] involve 
may present a closer analogy with the problem of the conflict of laws than with the 
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problem of conflicting obligations within the same legal system.’9 Philip Jessup, in his 
famous lectures on transnational law, also discussed the problem of applicable laws 
before international tribunals as one of choice of law and compared it explicitly with the 
task of the national judge in determining which law to apply.10 More recently, Andreas 
Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner have developed the idea that the national 
differentiation of law is now overlain by a sectorial differentiation and that conflicts 
between sectorial laws – regimes – must, like conflicts between national laws, be dealt 
with through a system of conflict of laws.11 One of us, in a relatively early book on the 
subject, briefly considered but rejected, for the time being, a private international law 
approach.12  
That said, extensive discussions of when and how a private international law 
approach would actually work to resolve public international law conflicts do not exist. 
Jenks discusses conflict avoidance more than conflict resolution. Jessup uses tools that 
are not those of conflict of laws. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner argue that the special 
character of conflicts among regimes requires the development of substantive norms, 
without a satisfactory explanation as to why exactly this should be so.13 Moreover, there 
is relatively little discussion on which of these two approaches is to be preferred under 
what circumstances. The reason may be that scholars writing in the field start from a 
certain assumption on the ontological challenge – namely, that international law is or 
should be a coherent system, or that it is not – and derive rules from that assumption. 
In this article, we do not set out to place the ontological question of whether 
international law is a system at the beginning of the research. Rather, we begin with a 
presentation of the two different approaches and a discussion of the prerequisites for their 
respective applicability (Parts II and III). We then discuss how these two approaches map 
on to the discussion of fragmentation of international law, without actually, at this stage, 
prioritizing one over the other. If anything, our claim would be that public international 
law conflicts are likely sui generis, with aspects of both conflict of norms and conflict of 
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laws, and that to resolve this type of conflicts one can learn and borrow from both 
approaches (Part IV). Finally, we take on the question of what this means for the 
systematic nature of international law (Part V).  All through this chapter, we do not offer 
a systematic analysis, but rather a number of examples to demonstrate the existence, and 
usefulness, of two very different sets of conflict rules.14 
An important message of this chapter for public international lawyers is this: the 
now frequently voiced unease amongst public international lawyers with traditional 
conflict-of-norms rules15 is best answered with private-international-law solutions. 
Although certain traditional conflict-of-laws rules cannot be used tel quel because the 
connecting factors they rely on – places, people, governmental interests – cannot be 
applied to regimes, functionally refined conflict-of-laws rules promise to be more helpful.  
Another core message of this chapter, targeted this time at a private international law 
audience, is that conflict of laws can operate not only between the laws of states but also 
to resolve public international law conflicts, but not all of them and in a contextually 
adapted fashion. 
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II. INTERACTIONS WITHIN LEGAL SYSTEMS: CONFLICT OF 
NORMS 
A. SOLUTIONS IN DOMESTIC LAW 
Legal systems provide their own tools to establish their internal coherence.16 More than 
one rule may a priori be applicable to a set of facts. Institutionally, internal coherence is 
established mainly through highest courts. Doctrinally, the solution lies in legal rules that 
determine the relation between different norms. European law in the civil law tradition 
(which historically relied less on courts to establish internal coherence procedurally) has 
been particularly robust in developing a number of presumptions of statutory 
interpretation to resolve conflicts between norms, but similar solutions are found in the 
common law. 
A first set of conflict rules acts at the level of hierarchy of norms. Thus, under the 
rule of lex superior derogat legi inferiori, the hierarchically superior rule trumps the 
hierarchically inferior. It is for this reason that constitutional law trumps ordinary 
statutory law, which in turn trumps common law rules; mandatory rules of contract law 
trump party agreements, and these agreements in turn trump subsidiary rules of contract 
law. 
Where no such hierarchy of sources exists and rules are enacted in the same field, 
for example in contract law, a second set of conflict rules must be developed. As between 
more general and more specific rules, for example, the one with the more specific scope 
of application applies (lex specialis derogate lege generali). Thus, general contract law is 
trumped by the specific rules on consumer contracts on the one hand or by those on 
commercial contracts on the other. Under the rule of lex posterior derogat lege anterior, a 
later rule is presumed to trump an earlier rule. Both lex specialis and lex posterior are 
presumptions as to the intent of the lawmaker or legislator on the issue in question. 
Presumably, a lawmaker, in regulating a specific area, wants to create special rules that 
trump the general rules in the field.  As a consequence, the presumption is that the latest 
and/or most specific legislative expression matters and prevails. According to the literal 
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rule, similar terms in different statutes are in principle presumed to have the same 
meaning. 
Finally, where rules with different functions are in conflict, the above, second set 
of conflict rules is of limited use. For example, rules of intellectual property may conflict 
with rules of antitrust law.  Intellectual property rules give the owner a monopoly over a 
certain intangible good, whereas antitrust law sets out to combat monopolies. Rules on 
freedom of speech may conflict with rules on personal dignity. The solution in most legal 
systems is one of balancing of interests, though this has frequently been criticized. 
B. PREREQUISITES 
All of this is well-known. What is sometimes underappreciated is the extent to which the 
above ‘conflict-of-norms’ rules work smoothly only insofar as we can assume that (i) all 
legal rules in play coexist within a single overarching system and (ii) the decision which 
rule to apply can be imputed, albeit by fiction, to a unitary lawmaker with a coherent 
legislative intent. This is why these rules are traditionally applied within legal systems, 
not between legal systems, and in a universe with a unitary lawmaker, not with many 
lawmakers. 
Thus, the lex superior principle requires a common system within which a 
hierarchy of norms can be established; it does not function between systems. Take, for 
example, the famous Yahoo! Case decided in 2000.17 In that case, French courts decided, 
essentially, that Yahoo!, a Californian company, could be banned from enabling the 
auctioning of Nazi literature on its Internet auction site, even though such a ban would be 
in conflict with the First Amendment of the US Constitution. Some authors have 
criticized this decision with the suggestion that the conflict between a statute and a 
constitutional rule must be resolved in favour of the Constitution.18 Such reasoning 
would be perfectly adequate if the conflict had arisen within one legal system, either 
between the French Constitution and a French statute, or between the US Constitution 
and a US statute. By contrast, where the conflict exists between a statute and a 
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Constitution of two different legal systems (with two ‘lawmakers’ independent from each 
other), the argument becomes unconvincing, because no hierarchical relation exists: the 
French legislator is not subject to the requirements of the US Constitution, and the US 
Constitution does not, on its own force, reach into France. This does not mean that the 
French court should not have considered the US Constitution at all, nor that the status of 
the US Constitution should play no role; only that the basis for this cannot be found in the 
lex superior principle. 
Presumptions of statutory interpretation, which work well among rules on the 
same level of hierarchy within one system, are similarly dependent on the presumption of 
a uniform legislator, even if this presumption is fictitious. As between legal systems, they 
lose much of their plausibility. For example, the lex specialis rule is grounded in the 
presumption that a legislator, in regulating a specific case, wants to carve out an 
exception from the general rules existing for a set of matters.19 As between countries or 
between national laws, it is hard to make a similar presumption. The French hate speech 
statute is more specific than the First Amendment, but it does not follow at all that it 
should therefore take priority as an exception to the First Amendment. Similar limitations 
exist for the lex posterior rule. The rule makes sense within one legal system, because the 
legislator can be presumed to legislate with knowledge of prior laws and thus with 
reference to those laws. This assumption is less warranted between legal systems.20 It 
seems quite implausible to argue, for example, that the US Constitution must stand back 
merely because it is older than the French statute in question. Similarly, the assumption 
that similar terms in different statutes have a similar meaning (the ‘literal rule’) makes 
sense within one legal system that strives for internal consistency, because we can 
presume that the unitary lawmaker means the same thing with similar terms. The 
assumption is much harder to make between different legal systems. For example, as 
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comparative lawyers have often warned us, contract in English law is not the same as 
contrat in French law;21 it is not even the same in English law as in US law. 
Finally, the balancing between rules serving different functions (eg Belgian 
intellectual property law versus Belgian antitrust law) is in principle linked to intra-
systemic reasoning as well. Rational balancing requires an objective standard for the 
respective weight of each principle to be balanced.22 If that standard cannot be derived 
from the intent of a unitary legislator, it must come from somewhere else, for example, a 
uniform standard of welfare maximization. As between legal systems, the problem is that 
the difference between the conflicting norms is typically a consequence of the fact that 
each of the systems uses a different ‘objective standard’ to define, weigh and ultimately 
balance the conflicting principles within its own system. Simplistically speaking, the US 
values freedom of speech higher than the need to ban anti-Semitic speech; the result of 
balancing speech and dignity within French law is different. Since balancing is a function 
of the relative weight of different principles, and this relative weight may be different 
within different legal systems, balancing between legal systems will often not resolve the 
conflict between these different balancing results.23  Brainerd Currie in particular, as the 
inventor of the governmental interest analysis in the field of conflict of laws, opposed 
such balancing between legal systems precisely for this reason, because it ignored the 
policy choice made by the forum’s legislator. In his view, a judge cannot balance the 
interests of its own legislator against those of another.24 Indeed, most methods of conflict 
of laws (though not all)25 oppose open balancing of interests and instead focus on the 
relative strength of policies. Similarly, the idea of finding a mix between different 
regimes, which Fischer-Lescano and Teubner propose for public international law 
conflicts, has been proposed occasionally as a solution for traditional choice-of-law 
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problems.26 However, most conflict-of-laws approaches eschew a mixture or compromise 
between different laws and instead designate either one or the other state’s law to apply.   
III. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN LEGAL SYSTEMS: CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 
A. SOLUTIONS IN DOMESTIC LAW 
One reason, then, for why conflicts between different legal systems are governed by 
different rules than are conflicts within one legal system, is that the rules developed for 
intra-systemic conflict do not work well in the context of inter-systemic conflict. There is 
no hierarchy between different legal systems, except for the relative hierarchy that each 
system may claim for itself over others. There is no overarching system within which 
rules on statutory interpretation could achieve coherence. There is no uniform legislative 
intent on which the resolution could be based. There is no neutral or mutually accepted 
standard under which different values could be balanced. 
The alternative is not anarchy but private international law. In private international 
law, several methods exist on how to resolve conflicts between legal systems. With gross 
simplification, it may be appropriate to present three methods: the traditional method, 
governmental interest analysis, and functional analysis. While the first two are tied to 
conflicts between state laws, the third one is more promising for international law. 
The first method, here called the traditional method, exists in both Europe and the 
United States, with some differences that need not concern us here.27 Under the 
traditional method, the applicable law is determined on the basis of conflict-of-laws rules 
designed for different areas of law in the abstract, without regard to the content of the 
substantive law. Essentially, determining the applicable law is a three-step endeavour. In a 
first step, the matter in question must be characterized as one of contract law, tort law, 
procedure, etc, so the applicable choice-of-law rule (eg that for contract or tort) can be 
determined. In a second step, application of this choice of law leads to the determination 
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of the applicable law on the basis of a connecting factor. Most of these connecting factors 
are either territorial (the place of the tort for matters of tort, the place of performance for 
matters of contract law, etc.) or personal (the law of nationality or of domicile for matters 
of personal status, etc.). In a third and final step, the law so determined is applied unless 
its application would violate the public policy of the forum law. 
A good example of this three-step analysis is provided by the Supreme Court of 
Delaware in Folk v York-Shipley, which applied this inter-systemic method to a conflict 
between the laws of different US states.28 The plaintiff, a Delaware domiciliary whose 
husband had died in a car collision in Pennsylvania, sued for loss of her husband’s 
consortium. Such a cause of action existed in Delaware’s law but not in Pennsylvania’s 
law. The court first had to characterize this issue as one of tort law (liability for a car 
accident) or one of family law (injury to a marriage): a tort claim would be governed by 
the law of the place of the injury, whereas a family law claim could arguably have been 
governed by the law of the common spousal domicile, which was Delaware. Once the 
issue was characterized as one of tort law, in a second step the place of the injury had to 
be determined and was determined to be the place of the car accident (Pennsylvania), not 
the place where the wife lived and where arguably her consortium was lost (Delaware). In 
a third step, finally, the Delaware court determined that the law of Pennsylvania applied. 
The court did not discuss, though it could have, whether Pennsylvania law should remain 
inapplicable because it violated a fundamental policy of Delaware so it would. 
A second approach, developed in opposition to the traditional method described 
above, is called governmental interest analysis. The starting point for this method is the 
‘governmental’ interest of a state in having its own law applied. Hence, the substance of 
the respective laws provides the starting point of the analysis (though their respective 
quality or desirability is not normally a criterion). Here, the first step is to determine 
which rules of law claim applicability, in view of both their text and of whether the 
respective legislative intent would be furthered by their application. If more than one 
state is interested in having its law applied and their laws differ, the resulting ‘true 
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conflict’ must be resolved, and various suggestions have been made for how such a 
conflict can be resolved. 
Perhaps the most important solution is that of ‘comparative impairment’: as 
between two conflicting laws, the judge should apply the law that would be more 
impaired by non-application.29  An example can be seen in Tucci v Club Méditerranée 
SA.30 Tucci, a Californian citizen, had been injured during his employment at a vacation 
camp operated by French defendant Club Méditerranée in the Dominican Republic. 
Under California law, Tucci had a tort claim because Club Méditerranée had no insurance 
with a company authorized in California. Under the law of the Dominican Republic, by 
contrast, workers compensation was the only available remedy. The court held that the 
law of the Dominican Republic established a quid pro quo between employers and 
employees by giving employees easy access to compensation while shielding employers 
from tort liability. This quid pro quo would be severely impaired if Tucci was granted a 
tort claim under Californian law. By contrast, if the law of the Dominican Republic 
applied and Tucci’s claims were limited to those under workers compensation, 
California’s interest would be insignificantly impaired: California’s interest in making 
sure that employees are adequately insured was fulfilled because Club Méditerranée in 
fact had insurance, albeit with a French, not a Californian insurer. Except for the 
insurance requirement, California provides for a quid pro quo comparable to that in the 
Dominican Republic. As a result, the law of the Dominican Republic was applied. Note 
that the court was not balancing policies; it balanced governmental interests. 
Finally, more recent methods of conflict of laws adopt variants of a functional 
perspective, even though the meaning of such a term and the method discussed under it 
differ among different authors and courts. In England, this means that the court should 
look for the proper law, the law most appropriate to govern the issue in question.31 In the 
United States, Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman developed a multifaceted 
method to determine the applicable law on the basis of a number of factors, including the 
relevant strength of the policies of the involved states, a comparative evaluation of the 
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30 Tucci v Club Mediterranee, SA. 89 Cal.App.4th 180 (2001). 
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Quarterly 437. 
asserted policies, a commonly held multi-state policy, and the degree of effective control 
each state has over the matter.32 In Europe, a functional approach led not to a rejection 
but a refinement of the traditional approach.33 The three steps of the European approach 
outlined above were maintained but disentangled from the idea that the applicable law 
should be based on the power of the state over its territory and its citizens. In all of these 
functional approaches, the search is ultimately for the most appropriate law, the law with 
the closest connection to the facts, considering a variety of factors. 
B. PREREQUISITES 
The above conflict-of-laws methods are quite closely linked to relations between different 
legal systems.  They do not function well for intra-systemic conflicts. To explain why this 
is the case we must engage in a somewhat more elaborate discussion because the reasons 
are slightly different for each of the approaches discussed. 
The traditional method is hard to apply to intra-systemic conflicts for two reasons. 
First, the approach presumes that the conflict occurs between two legal orders that are 
essentially complete, insofar as each of them must have rules in the same area of law: tort 
law, contract law, etc. Where, for example, the issue is characterized as one of tort law, 
the conflict is between two tort laws (eg those of Pennsylvania and Delaware). Although 
such situations exist also, occasionally, within legal systems (eg between general contract 
law and consumer contract law), a second reason makes the traditional approach difficult 
to apply to almost all intra-systemic conflicts. Under the traditional approach, the 
applicable law is determined through either a territorial or a personal connecting factor, 
and such factors are often absent within legal systems.34 The distinction between general 
contract law and consumer contract law, for example, cannot be made on the basis of 
territorial factors because they are not territorially distinct. It can be made on the basis of 
                                                 
32 Arthur T Von Mehren & Donald T Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems (Boston, Little, Brown, & 
Co, 1965); summarized in Symeon C Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present 
and Future (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) 28-29. 
33 See Michaels above (n 27 at 1616. 
34 They have become problematic also for conflicts between domestic laws because of the diminished role 
of territoriality; see Ralf Michaels, ‘Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny's Private International Law 
and the Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization, in M Stolleis and W Streeck (eds), Aktuelle 
Fragen politischer und rechtlicher Steuerung im Kontext der Globalisierung (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2007) 
114, also available at http://lsr.nellco.org/duke_fs/15/. 
personal factors, depending on whether one party is a consumer or not.35 Yet other 
conflicts–that between nuisance as a tort and property, for example–cannot. 
Governmental interest analysis, in turn, is hard to apply to intra-systemic conflicts 
for a related reason: it assumes the coexistence of two governments whose interests are in 
question and potentially in conflict. As between two systems, each with its own 
government, it may be possible to determine which government has the greater interest. 
Within one legal system, this is impossible, as long as, at least in theory, the same 
government or ‘lawmaker’ is concerned. 
The relative inadequacy of conflict-of-laws approaches for intra-systemic 
conflicts is no coincidence. Both the traditional method and governmental interest 
analysis are catered specifically to conflicts between states. The choice of connecting 
factors – territory, citizenship, governmental interests – mirrors closely the classical 
definition of the state as based on three elements: a territory, a population, a government 
structure.36 In international law, by contrast, even where we can speak of different sub-
systems or branches of international law (say, WTO37 law and human rights law), these 
are not defined by territory or personality, and neither WTO law nor human rights law has 
its own government with conceivable governmental interests, so the criteria developed in 
these particular conflict-of-laws approaches are not applicable as such. Moreover, in 
conflicts between states, the use of such factors makes it possible to allocate issues 
among states precisely because these states resemble each other structurally and 
functionally–each state displays these abstract criteria, and each state generally performs 
the same functions. Within one system this method is often inapplicable because different 
statutes, different sectors of the law, do not display the same structure and do not perform 
the same function. If, for example, Belgian general contract law and Belgian consumer 
law performed the same functions one of them would be redundant and likely abolished. 
The functional approach to conflict of laws appears to be less open to such 
criticism. The search for the proper law (or norm), the designation of the applicable law 
(or norm) on functional grounds, appear, to some extent, to be possible regardless of 
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(is the person a consumer or not?) but the transaction (is it a consumer contract or not?). 
36 Michaels,  above (n 34) at 121, 128-37. 
37 World Trade Organization. 
whether we are within one system or between systems. Indeed, in this sense the 
functional approach to inter-systemic conflicts is in many ways not so different from the 
functional approach to intra-systemic conflicts discussed above. However, differences do 
exist.  First, in intra-systemic conflicts the focus is on balancing laws (recall the IP versus 
anti-trust law example); in inter-systemic conflicts it is on balancing respective regulatory 
interests (recall the notion of comparative impairment). Second, in intra-systemic 
conflicts, the functional approach aims at coherence; in inter-systemic conflicts, it aims at 
coordination. Third, in intra-systemic conflicts, a functional approach can lead to mixed 
or compromise solutions; in inter-systemic conflicts, the aim is to maintain the internal 
integrity of each system by designating one or the other, and to minimize the 
consequences of frictions. 
 
IV. INTERACTIONS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Which of the above approaches is more adequate for conflicts within public international 
law or for fragmented public international law? At first sight, the core question may seem 
to be whether international law is more like one system or more like the combination of 
several systems: if it is one system, we should use a conflict-of-norms approach; if it is a 
combination of systems, we should use a private international law approach. 
We do not think this is the most useful order of steps. Whether international law 
behaves like a system or not is in no small part determined by the very way in which 
relations between rules are handled. If we choose intra-systemic rules to govern relations 
between, say, the international trade and climate change regimes, this very choice 
constructs international law as a system. If we choose inter-systemic rules to address 
interactions, this constructs public international law as a plurality and a uniform system 
of public international law no longer emerges.  This suggests, however, that we need not 
start with the ontological question (Is public international law one system or not?). 
Instead, we can start by addressing the pragmatic question of which rules work best for 
different contexts (conflict of norms or conflict of laws?) and determine in the light of the 
answers how to understand public international law. 
A. GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 
One important type of interaction between rules of international law is that between 
treaties and general international law. Treaties, ratified by explicit consent by a certain 
number of states, are akin to contracts or contractual regimes. For example, the WTO 
treaty38 and the Kyoto Protocol39 are binding (only) on the states that agreed on and 
ratified these treaties. General international law (to some extent akin to codes and statutes 
or common law) encompasses the rules that states are ‘born into’ and that are binding on 
all states irrespective of explicit consent and subject matter. For example, general 
international law rules on treaty interpretation or state responsibility are by default 
applicable in both the context of the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol. General international 
law includes customary international law and general principles of law. To some extent, it 
includes also quasi-constitutional norms, in particular, jus cogens, from which no treaty 
can deviate. 
For interactions and conflicts between treaties and general international law, intra-
systemic conflict rules work well. The reason is simple but deserves repeating: this type 
of interaction closely resembles the interaction of rules within a single legal system. If 
general international law and, in particular, rules of jus cogens exist at all, they must by 
necessity, in order to be general, exist within – or constitute – a legal system. Denying the 
systemic character of international law implies denying the existence of general 
international law.  Notably, the absence of a unitary lawmaker or source of authority is no 
counterargument – the unitary lawmaker is assumed as a fiction, as in Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), which refers, to the 
‘international community of States’ as the creator of jus cogens.40  
                                                 
38 By “WTO treaty” we mean the final act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, concluded in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 15 April 1994, published in WTO Secretariat, 
The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Legal Texts (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
39 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998). 
40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 
1980), 1155 UNTS 331. For the counterfactual nature of international community, see David Cs Ellis, ‘On 
the Possibility of ‘‘International Community’’’ (2009) 11 International Studies Review 1; see also Berit 
Bliesemann de Guevara and Florian P Kühn, ‘The “International Community” – Rhetoric or Reality?’ 
(2009) 27 Sicherheit und Frieden/Security and Peace 73. 
In this intra-systemic constellation, the lex superior rule as we know it within 
domestic legal systems can be used for hierarchical relations. Jus cogens is then the 
‘higher law’ prevailing over all other rules of the international law ‘system’. In this sense, 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, which provides that ‘[a] treaty is void if, at the time 
of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law,’ states 
little more than a definitional truism. This hierarchical structure – jus cogens trumps 
treaties – does not, in and of itself, resolve conflicts, because it does not define whether a 
given rule of general international law is jus cogens (and thus trumps treaties) or not. The 
notion of hierarchy itself does not even implicate that there must be any rules of jus 
cogens at all. However, it does capture that to the extent that rules belong to jus cogens, 
conflicts between them and treaties are questions of hierarchy within a legal system. 
Similarly, lex specialis, another intra-systemic conflict rule discussed above, 
works well for interactions between general international law and specific treaties (such 
as the WTO treaty). This is made explicit, eg, in Article 55 of the ILC Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility (generally considered part of customary international law), which 
explicitly confirms, under the heading of ‘lex specialis’, that ‘[t]hese articles [ie the ILC 
Draft Articles] do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence 
of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international 
responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law’.41   
Finally, the presumption against conflict and the principle of ‘systemic 
integration’, as they are known in international law,42 are (much like the intra-systemic 
literal rule discussed earlier`) built on the premise that the legislator or specific group of 
contracting states must be presumed not to want to deviate from, or contradict, an earlier 
expression or rule. Again, for the intra-systemic type of interaction between general 
international law and treaties this presumption fits well: we can presume that, for 
example, two states that conclude a treaty did so with the background of general 
international law, to which they are both bound, in mind. 
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UN Doc A/56/10 (2001), 26 ff. See the commentary ibid 140-41. 
42 See Vienna Convention (n 40) Article 31.3(c), directing that treaties must be interpreted ‘taken into 
account, together with the context: … (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties’. On systemic integration, see also ILC Fragmentation Report (n 1) at paras 17 ff. 
B. CONFLICTS WITHIN ONE BRANCH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Similar considerations apply to norm relations within one branch of international law, 
such as within the WTO system or within the realm of the law of the sea.43 For example, 
pursuant to Article XVI:3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, this 
Agreement prevails over all other agreements within the WTO – an application of the 
intra-systemic lex superior principle.44 Pursuant to the lex specialis rule, specific 
agreements on trade in goods (say, Agriculture) prevail over the more general rules in the 
GATT.  Article 311.1 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS)45 
confirms the lex posterior principle when stating that ‘[t]his Convention shall prevail, as 
between States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 
1958.’ In these cases, it is possible to assume a fictitious WTO or UN law of the sea 
‘legislator’. Granted, the actual negotiating parties change constantly – countries join and 
leave treaties as the United States did with UNESCO, withdrawing in 1984 and rejoining 
in 2003, or China, which left the GATT in 1950 and joined the WTO in 2001. 
Nonetheless, there is still enough institutional coherence, continuity and memory to make 
the fiction of a unitary lawmaker plausible. 
A broader application of the intra-systemic lex posterior rule is found in Article 30 
of the Vienna Convention: for parties bound by two treaties, ‘the earlier treaty applies 
only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty’ (Article 
30:3).  Interestingly, the very title as well as paragraph 1 of Article 30 state explicitly that 
this lex posterior rule applies only between ‘treaties relating to the same subject matter’.  
This suggests that the rule was written mainly with intra-systemic conflicts in mind, that 
is, successive treaties, within the same field or branch of international law, broadly 
speaking.46 Indeed, although the lex posterior rule has occasionally been used to resolve 
                                                 
43 We leave open the question what exactly constitutes a sub-branch of International Law. 
44 ‘In the event of a conflict between a provision of this Agreement and a provision of any of the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.’ 
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into 
force 1 January 1995), 1867 UNTS 154. 
45 ‘This Convention shall prevail, as between States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on the Law of 
the Sea of 29 April 1958’. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 
1982, entered into force 14 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3. 
46 That said, the ‘same subject matter’ in Article 30 could also be interpreted more broadly as covering any 
situation where two norms conflict or overlap including, for example, norms from different branches, such 
as trade and environmental treaties or NAFTA and WTO law: if they so conflict, can one not presume that 
conflicts between two branches of international law, this creates some unease. Take 
GATT: the original GATT47 was concluded in 1947 so that the later Treaty of Rome48 or 
Montreal Protocol49 would arguably prevail over it; yet, when GATT 199450 was 
concluded, did this mean that GATT rules now all of a sudden trump the earlier EC 
Treaty or Montreal Protocol? And that with the recent Lisbon Treaty51, GATT must again 
give way? One way to alleviate this unease is to rank the lex specialis principle above the 
lex posterior rule, so the more specific EC Treaty then prevails over GATT irrespective of 
GATT’s timing. Yet, on what basis is one to decide that a treaty or specific norm is ‘more 
specific’? Another option is to deny that in those situations we are talking about 
successive treaties in the first place by qualifying either or both of these treaties as 
‘continuing’ or ‘living’ treaties (so that Article 30, by its very terms, does not apply).52 
Another, perhaps easier, explanation follows from our discussion earlier: Article 30 and 
lex posterior should presumptively not apply to interactions between different branches 
of international law because those interactions are more akin to inter-systemic conflict, a 
type of conflict not well-suited for application of the lex posterior principle.   
C. CONFLICTS BETWEEN BRANCHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The most pressing problems of public international law fragmentation concern conflicts 
between functional sub-systems or branches of international law – trade and environment, 
finance and human rights, etc.  This is the context in which traditional intra-systemic 
conflict rules have proven unsatisfactory. As noted earlier, the mechanical lex posterior 
rule does not work well for conflicts between EU and WTO law or between GATT and 
                                                                                                                                                 
they cover the ‘same subject matter’?  See Pauwelyn (n 5) at 364.  However, when applying the lex 
posterior rule to successive treaties in different fields or branches, the rule is often less convincing (ibid at 
377 and Koskenniemi Report (n 2), para 255, quoted above in n 15). 
47 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (adopted 30 October 1947,_entered into force 29 July 
1948) 55 UNTS 194. 
48 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (adopted 25 March 1957, entered into force 1 
January 1958) 298 UNTS 11 (Treaty of Rome). 
49 Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (adopted 16 September 1987, entered into force 1 January 
1989) 1522 UNTS 3 (Montreal Protocol). 
50 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 187. 
51 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, 13 December 2007 OJ (C 306) 50. 
52 See Pauwelyn (n 5) at 489-90; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as 
a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 903, 908-09. 
multilateral environmental treaties and leads to surprising and often unconvincing results. 
The same is often true with respect to the lex specialis principle: how is one to decide 
whether, for example, a restriction on trade in an endangered species is more specifically 
covered by a WTO rule (as a trade matter) or by a CITES provision (as an environmental 
matter), given that no neutral higher authority exists to make this decision? And should 
treaty parties be able to undermine their WTO obligations merely by formulating a 
specific rule?  This is, in our view, in no small measure due to the fact that this type of 
conflict is more akin to inter-systemic conflict for which intra-systemic conflict rules 
such as lex posterior and lex specialis were not designed. 
There are two reasons why intra-systemic rules may be inadequate. The first is 
that the fiction of the unitary lawmaker, a prerequisite of these rules as we saw earlier, 
becomes increasingly implausible in the modern context of highly specialized, functional 
regimes. International trade, investment, environment and human rights law, each with 
their own international institution and/or club of negotiators, enforcement mechanisms, 
epistemic communities, related national ministries, NGOs and even academics, make it 
increasingly difficult to assume a unitary lawmaker with a sufficient sense of institutional 
coherence, continuity and memory across these different branches.  As a result, 
application of the intra-systemic rules of lex superior, lex posterior or lex specialis and 
the related quest for the genuine intent of international law’s ‘unitary lawmaker’ have 
become increasingly strenuous.53 This raises the obvious question whether and when to 
shift from such conflict-of-norms rules to conflict-of-laws rules. 
The second reason, related to the first, is that when it comes to tensions between 
branches of international law it becomes difficult to devise a neutral perspective from 
which neutral conflict solutions could be formulated. Instead, each branch typically has 
its own rules or perspective for dealing with conflicts, and these rules or starting points 
often differ.  For example, as noted earlier, there may be little point in trying to define the 
lex specialis in the interaction between trade agreements and environmental agreements: 
from the perspective of the trade agreement, the trade rule will be more specific (as in 
‘trade in’ environmentally sensitive goods); from the viewpoint of the environmental 
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treaty, the environmental rule will be more specific (as in ‘environmental concerns’ 
related to trade). 
Sometimes, this neutrality problem becomes explicit in the text of conventions. 
GATT Article XXIV, for example, states that regional trade agreements such as NAFTA 
are subject to certain GATT principles, thereby setting up the GATT as lex superior. 
Article 103 of NAFTA, in contrast, explicitly states that in the event of conflict between 
GATT and NAFTA, NAFTA prevails. A similar tension exists between Article 103 of the 
UN Charter, setting up Charter obligations as leges superiores, and the WTO rule that 
WTO panels may not ‘add to or diminish’ from WTO covered agreements which some 
have read as a conflict rule defining WTO law as lex superior.54 Other examples 
illustrating the problematic nature of lex superior in inter-systemic type conflicts 
encompass interactions between UN and EC treaties, EC law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, UNCLOS and WTO law, etc.  The problem of applying 
lex superior in this context is reminiscent of the Yahoo! example discussed earlier and the 
impossibility to establish a hierarchy between a French statute and a US constitutional 
rule.55 
Sometimes, balancing is suggested as a solution. However, as discussed earlier, 
balancing as a conflict rule may work well within a system but not between sub-systems 
or branches of international law. If both international trade tribunals and environmental 
tribunals each engage in rational balancing, in the absence of a common, objective 
standard (available essentially only within a single ‘system’) the value judgments 
involved in balancing are likely to lead to different results, depending on the values or 
perspectives inherent in the trade system as opposed to the environmental system. For 
example, when the WTO balances trade as against environmental protection under GATT 
Article XX, the environment is set up as an exception for which the burden of proof rests 
on the country attempting to protect the environment. In addition, environmental 
measures may only trump trade liberalization rules in case they are ‘necessary’ and there 
is no ‘less trade restrictive alternative’ available.  Before an environmental tribunal, the 
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opposite would likely be true, with, for example, environmental protection as the rule, 
and trade liberalization as the exception. 
This suggests that to the extent conflicts between sub-branches of international 
law become more akin to inter-systemic conflicts, applying the intra-systemic conflict 
rules of lex superior, lex specialis, lex posterior or balancing becomes more strenuous. If 
scholars have clung to such rules nonetheless, the reason may well be their fear that the 
alternative would be some unorganized legal pluralism. If it can be shown that inter-
systemic rules, if and where appropriately applied, can provide a certain degree of 
coordination, such fears might be alleviated. 
Here, we can only sketch some such possibilities. One would be to develop 
private-international-law rules on the basis of connecting factors, except that these 
connecting factors cannot be those of territory or personality (as in domestic inter-
systemic conflict rules) but must be functional, institutional and/or procedural connecting 
factors pointing toward one branch of international law rather than the other (eg as the 
‘proper law’). Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, who advocate a somewhat comparable 
approach, argue that any solution of the conflict cannot result in an either/or decision but 
must somehow combine aspects of both regimes, because most conflicts have relevant 
effects within more than one sub-system.56 But effects within more than one system are 
characteristic of traditional private-international-law situations between states, too. In the 
example from the Delaware court discussed earlier,57 the claim for loss of consortium 
undoubtedly has effects in both tort and family law, and in both Pennsylvania and 
Delaware. Here, the goal is not to determine whether the issue is ‘really’ one of tort or 
one of marriage law (it clearly touches on both), but instead which law is more 
appropriately applied. Similarly, in international law, we would not ask whether an issue 
‘really’ belongs to trade or environmental law, but rather, which regime is more 
appropriate to be applied to the particular fact pattern. Applying the trade rather than the 
environmental regime is not a simple preference of trade interests over environment 
interest, but a preference of the decision in the trade regime on the role of environmental 
concerns over the decision within the environmental regime on the role of trade. This is a 
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question not confined to ‘true conflicts’; it is a question also where the different regimes 
provide norms that are equivalent, in other words, the case of MSEN. 
Arguably, this is what really goes on when international tribunals exercise the 
jurisdiction to ‘interpret the submissions of the parties’ so as to ‘isolate the real issue in 
the case and to identify the object of the claim’.58 We can also find such a search for the 
‘closest connection’ in the decision in Southern Bluefin Tuna. The tribunal in that case did 
not think the conflict belonged only to one or the other regime, as ‘it is a commonplace of 
international law and State Practice for more than one treaty to bear upon a particular 
dispute.’59  Nonetheless, because the dispute was ‘centered’ in the 1993 Convention for 
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, that Convention became the basis for the 
decision. The tribunal did not deny that the conflict also ‘arose’ under UNCLOS.  Rather, 
it concluded that ‘[t]o find that, in this case, there is a dispute actually arising under 
UNCLOS which is distinct from the dispute that arose under the [1993 Convention] 
would be artificial’.60 
Another example of an inter-systemic conflict rule operational in international law 
can be derived from Article 22 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which 
holds that 
the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any 
Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, except 
where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage 
or threat to biological diversity.61  
 
The provision shows that the CBD does not claim absolute superiority over other treaties 
(as noted earlier, in inter-systemic type conflicts this self-positioning as lex superior 
would likely be futile). The CBD does claim priority only where a serious damage or 
threat to biological diversity must be expected. This rule can be explained as an 
application of the public policy exception. Article 22 does not resolve conflicts 
                                                 
58 Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Rep # 262, para 29; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France) 
[1974] ICJ Rep # 466, para 30; and Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) [1988] ICJ Rep# 437. 
59 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v Japan, Australia v Japan), Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards XXIII, 1, para 52.  
60 Ibid at para 54, emphasis added. But see the forceful separate opinion by Sir Kenneth Keith ibid at paras 
1, 10-13, 30-1. 
61 Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993) 1760 
UNTS 79. 
universally, because the competing treaty might simultaneously claim priority, but it does 
provide a structure for addressing these conflicts from the perspective of one regime in a 
way to minimize the conflict.  
A different kind of hands-off-approach-within-limits for inter-systemic type 
conflicts can be found in the now well-established Solange II approach to the interaction 
between German constitutional law and EC law, as well as between the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Bosphorus 
case.62 Each of those regimes could have a legitimate claim to superiority; yet, as 
discussed, when faced with inter-systemic conflicts, such claim risks having little effect. 
Instead, a certain accommodation was found where each of these regimes or courts 
recognized the other but added that where the encroachment becomes too serious, 
superiority will be reclaimed–not with binding force for the other regime, but only by 
each side for itself. Where the encroachment is not serious, there is a presumption of 
equivalence among the different regimes (a case of MSEN) that facilitates deference. 
Consider finally the Preamble of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.63 The 
Preamble first invokes the principle of mutual support among trade and environment 
agreements. Applying this principle, it maintains that the Protocol ‘shall not be 
interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any 
existing international agreements’, especially the WTO. However, in the very next 
paragraph, we find that the Protocol is not subordinated to the WTO. This text displays a 
desire to maintain intra-systemic coherence and consistency, and in its great abstraction 
also shows the limits of such a desire. It may, at times, be more appropriate to treat the 
conflict between trade and environment as one more akin to inter-systemic conflict. From 
this perspective, the principle of mutual support could then be read as the principle of 
comity which provides the historical basis for conflict of laws between states. Conflict of 
laws has become much more refined; an invocation of comity is rarely necessary in view 
of the fine-grained conflict-of-laws rules approaches we have.64 A similar development 
                                                 
62 ‘Solange II’, BvR 2, 197/83, (1987) 3 Common Market Law Reports 225; Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm 
v Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 1; cf Karen Knop, Ralf Michaelsand Annelise Riles, ‘International Law in 
Domestic Courts: A Conflict of Laws Approach’ 2009 ASIL Proceedings (forthcoming). 
63 29 January 2000, 39 ILM 1027 (2000). 
64 See, eg, Michaels n 8 above; but see now Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflicts: Resituating 
Comity as Conflict of Laws (forthcoming). 
may be more attractive for the relationship between trade and environment, instead of the 
solutions centred in interpretation and hierarchical subordination, which the Protocol has 
in mind, and which tend towards circularity. 
D. MULTI-SOURCED EQUIVALENT NORMS 
Finally, what does all of this mean for multi-sourced equivalent norms (MSEN)?  In our 
view, a method borrowed from conflict of laws appears particularly fruitful for MSEN, 
because the problem addressed by MSEN is familiar in that field. MSEN have been 
defined as rules that are ‘(1) binding upon the same international legal subjects; (2) 
similar or identical in their normative content (in the words of the ILC, ‘“point in the 
same direction”); and (3) have been established through different international 
instruments or “legislative” procedures or are applicable in different substantive areas of 
the law.’65 In focusing on rules that point in the same direction, they fill a gap left open 
by the ILC Fragmentation Report that is addressed almost exclusively at rules pointing in 
different directions.66 This distinction between rules pointing in different directions and 
rules pointing in the same direction is discussed, in governmental interest analysis 
(explained earlier), as the distinction between true and false conflicts. True conflicts 
describe situations in which the policies of different states are in conflict. (This definition 
is in accordance with more recent definitions of conflict in international law, which go 
beyond rules that cannot be obeyed at the same time and include rules that pursue 
different goals.)67 False conflicts, by contrast, describe situations in which either only one 
of the two policies is implicated, or–and this makes for the parallel with MSENs –where 
the policies of both states or of both regimes are congruent.68 The typical solution is then 
for the court to apply forum law. 
MSEN exist both within and between sub-systems of international law. For 
example, ‘national treatment’ as a MSEN can be found in the WTO and in NAFTA, 
spread across the branches of trade and investment law. At the same time, national 
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treatment is also sprinkled as a principle in various WTO agreements within the WTO 
regime. Equivalent rules on the use of force, as addressed in the Nicaragua case,69 are set 
out in custom and in treaties, within the same ‘system’ or in the intra-systemic interaction 
between general international law and treaties defined earlier. In the context of 
investment arbitration, similar principles may be set out in an investment contract under 
domestic law as well as in the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) under international law, 
that is, across the national and international ‘systems’. Yet, we submit that the problem 
dealt with under the title of conflict of norms or conflict of laws is structurally capable of 
accounting at least for some types of MSEN as well. 
 One example for the treatment of MSEN can be found in Art. 189.4(a)-(c) of the 
EC Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA):70 
(a) When a Party seeks redress of a violation of an obligation under the WTO 
Agreement, it shall have recourse to the relevant rules and procedures of the WTO 
Agreement, which apply notwithstanding the provisions of this Agreement. 
(b) When a Party seeks redress of a violation of an obligation under this Part of 
the Agreement, it shall have recourse to the rules and procedures of this Title. 
(c) Unless the Parties otherwise agree, when a Party seeks redress of a violation of 
an obligation under this Part of the Agreement which is equivalent in substance to 
an obligation under the WTO, it shall have recourse to the relevant rules and 
procedures of the WTO Agreement, which apply notwithstanding the provisions 
of this Agreement. 
 
The rule seems to have been written under the assumption of a relation of 
hierarchy vis-à-vis the WTO. Such a relation is not necessary, as the example of NAFTA-
WTO showed. And indeed, rules 4(a) and 4(b) display a strong sense of an inter-systemic 
approach more prone to conflict-of-laws rules than conflict-of-norms rules. Thus, both 
Articles 4(a) and 4(b) base the applicable law on the close connection between 
obligations under a Treaty and the rules and procedures connected with them, an 
approach in tune with the traditional method of conflict of laws that designate entire legal 
systems, not just individual norms, to apply. 
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The most interesting provision in this context, however, is Art. 4(c) of the FTA 
with its special regime for MSEN.  Here, the otherwise necessary connection between 
rule and context is given up. Instead, the provision adopts an approach comparable to 
governmental interest analysis of laws, where the situation described would be viewed as 
a false conflict: not a situation in which only one regime is interested in the application of 
its law, but a situation in which the application of one law in fact furthers the interests of 
the other regime as well. Under governmental interest analysis, such situations are 
typically resolved in favour of forum law: New York is free to apply its own wrongful 
death statute if doing so furthers also the policies of Massachusetts. Here, the resolution 
is in favour of the rules of the WTO, but structurally this is not different. In both cases, 
one law–forum law in the domestic conflict-of-laws analysis, WTO law in the WTO-FTA 
context – is presumably applicable, but under certain conditions, in particular a difference 
in the relevant policies, a deviation can be justified. 
This example suggests more generally that, at least for some types of MSEN, a 
conflict-of-laws approach may be appropriate. The idea that equivalent rules exist in 
different regimes (such as national treatment in the WTO and Chile-EU FTA) is familiar 
from an inter-systemic context, namely from comparative law: in comparative law, the 
functional method presumes that different legal systems will contain if not similar then at 
least functionally equivalent rules (eg on contracts or tort), because each legal system is 
internally complete and thus needs to respond to essentially the same challenges as every 
other legal system.71 Both French and English law have rules dealing with questions of 
enforcing contractual consensus; the question in conflict of laws is which of the two is 
applicable. The same situation occurs in international law, for example, as between 
NAFTA and the WTO, or the Chile-EU FTA and the WTO: both aim at resolving, 
essentially, the same challenges (in this case, nationality-based discrimination in an 
economic context). They contain MSENs because they are not perfectly integrated. Thus, 
to the extent international law develops more or less complete regimes in parallel (albeit 
centred on limited principles such as national treatment or non-discrimination), a conflict-
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of-laws approach seems most promising.  This is the link between MSEN, the general 
topic of this volume, and the conflict-of-laws alternative, suggested in this chapter. 
 
V.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: IS INTERNATIONAL LAW A 
SYSTEM? 
So far, we have deliberately discussed the technical question – the respective adequacy of 
different sets of rules for different types of public international law conflicts – without 
addressing the ontological question whether international law is a system. The result has 
been that international law can actually borrow rules from both, and that different sets of 
rules are better for different types of conflicts. This means that the normative implications 
of whether international law is a system are actually not that great. Nonetheless, the 
question remains relevant, and some implications emerge from our analysis.  
One tendency seems to be this: interactions between treaty-regimes (eg the WTO) 
and general international law (eg the law of treaties or state responsibility) are better 
resolved with rules made for intra-systemic conflicts and relate to international law as a 
‘system’. Similarly, conflicts within branches of international law, for example within the 
WTO treaty, appear to benefit from intra-systemic rules and thereby suggest that it makes 
sense to conceive of the WTO as a (sub-)system. 
In contrast, for interactions between specialized treaty regimes (say, 
environmental law versus trade law), traditional intra-systemic rules do not always 
provide satisfactory frameworks for analysis. However, as we demonstrate above, this 
emergence of different sub-systems or legal pluralism need not result in anarchy. Rather, 
coordination between these branches or sub-systems can occur, albeit imperfectly, 
through inter-systemic conflict-of-laws rules. This suggests that in these aspects 
international law is better seen as an unsystematic plurality of systems or regimes, 
without the need of conceiving these systems as self-contained.  
What does this mean for the question whether international law is a system or not? 
First, we have seen that the question is far less important than the drafters of the ILC 
Fragmentation Report appear to have thought, because the technical question – which set 
of rules is adequate for which type of interaction between rules – can be answered 
without recourse to this ontological question. Second, to the extent that the answers to the 
technical question allow for conclusions, they suggest that it is useful to conceive of 
international law as a system for some aspects and as the interaction of various systems in 
others. It suggests that one set of conflicts rules – conflict-of-norms rules – is appropriate 
for one set of conflicts, and another set of conflicts rules – conflict-of-laws rules – is 
appropriate for the other. The criticism of international law as a system thus has it half 
right: international law is not a full-fledged system, and traditional conflict-of-norms 
rules are not always appropriate to resolve public international law conflicts. However, 
this finding does not lead to anarchy but instead into another set of conflicts rules. 
International law may, therefore, be a system at some level (in the sense, for 
example, that all of its rules and branches interact and are governed by certain general 
rules without there being so-called self-contained regimes72), but a universe of different 
systems, sub-systems or branches at another level (in the sense, for example, that rules 
within the WTO treaty interact differently than a WTO rule interacts with the Kyoto 
Protocol). The outcome is not chaos and anarchy but a more sophisticated legal 
landscape, consequence of, to use the very title of the ILC Study Group, ‘the 
diversification and expansion of international law’.  Put differently, applying private 
international law solutions to public international law conflicts – or recognizing that 
certain conflicts of international law may be more akin to a conflict between Belgian and 
German law than a conflict between one Belgian norm and another – need not mean the 
end of international law.  On the contrary, it highlights the increased maturity and 
complexity of international law and its unique, hybrid features as a sui generis type of 
legal order. 
If all of this is correct, then the first question for relations between international 
law norms, or regimes, is neither whether international law is a system or not, nor which 
norm or which regime should prevail, if any. The first question is which approach should 
be used to resolve the conflict, that of conflict of norms or that of conflict of laws. This 
question cannot and need not be determined with regard to an ontology of international 
law; it must be established anew for many new conflicts. The dynamic and evolutionary 
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character of international law makes it unlikely that the internal differentiation of 
international law either is static or follows a predetermined path. The dependence of 
international law on its actual practice suggests that how we resolve certain conflicts has 
an effect on the very nature of these conflicts.  How we resolve conflicts determines what 
international law is. This is one more reason for why we should think hard before blindly 
applying the conventional wisdom of conflict of norms.  As international law diversifies 
and matures, some public international law conflicts may well be best resolved through 
private international law solutions.  This chapter opens the way for such alternative 
approach. Elaborating specific conflict-of-law rules for certain public international law 
conflicts is the logical next step.    
